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Abstract
In the on-line Explore & Exploit literature, central to Machine Learning, a central
planner is faced with a set of alternatives, each yielding some unknown reward. The
planner’s goal is to learn the optimal alternative as soon as possible, via experimen-
tation. A typical assumption in this model is that the planner has full control over
the experiment design and implementation. When experiments are implemented by a
society of self-motivated agents the planner can only recommend experimentation but
has no power to enforce it. Kremer et. al. [9] introduce the first study of explore
and exploit schemes that account for agents’ incentives. In their model it is implicitly
assumed that agents do not see nor communicate with each other. Their main result is
a characterization of an optimal explore and exploit scheme. In this work we extend [9]
by adding a layer of a social network according to which agents can observe each other.
It turns out that when observability is factored in the scheme proposed by Kremer et.
al. is no longer incentive compatible. In our main result we provide a tight bound on
how many other agents can each agent observe and still have an incentive-compatible
algorithm and asymptotically optimal outcome. More technically, for a setting with
N agents where the number of nodes with degree greater than Nα is bounded by Nβ
and 2α+ β < 1 we construct incentive-compatible asymptotically optimal mechanism.
The bound 2α+ β < 1 is shown to be tight.
1 Introduction
In a variety of settings members of a society are faced with a set of possible actions which
rewards are unknown. Each agent chooses her action and social learning may entail that
many will choose the optimal action. This may be the case for selecting among alternative
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routes for traveling from one location to another, choosing a holiday destination, choosing
a service provider (e.g., an accountant or an ISP) and more. In such settings the a-priori
optimal alternative may often be a-posteriori inferior but nevertheless, as no one would like
to experiment with an a-priori inferior alternative, society might converge on the wrong
action resulting in a market failure.
A similar dilemma is central to on-line Explore & Exploit paradigm [E&E], a rich research
area in Machine learning [ML] [6]. In that setting, a central planner wants to learn the
optimal action as soon as possible. To do so he can try out various actions and based on
the history of results decide on whether to continue with experimentation or to exploit his
knowledge. In this literature the central planner has full control over the experiment design
and the history of results. A natural question is how this E&E paradigm works out when
the experiments are actually controlled by self motivated agents and the central planner can
only make recommendations for actions.
When modeling society of agents where actions are taken in a decentralized fashion one
typically accounts for some of the key aspects of the society. Such key aspects include the
incentive structure of the individuals, the communication structure among the agents and
the private prior information agents may hold. These three modeling ingredients are central
to the literature on social learning, where agents have initial conflicting beliefs on the optimal
action but learn from each other while taking actions simultaneously and repeatedly. This
literature has its roots in Aumann’s agreeing to disagree [3] and has been later extended in a
variety of papers (e.g.,[7, 13, 12, 11]). The literature on herding also studies how these three
components interact. In the herding literature, similar to the E&E setting above, agents act
sequentially and each agent acts once. Initially, more emphasis has been given in the herding
literature to the subjective information structure (e.g., [4, 15, 5, 2]).1 However, recently the
importance of the social network structure has been acknowledged (see [1] for a discussion of
the observability assumption). In the herding literature one may also observe market failure
despite of the fact that the collective holds the information required for making the optimal
choice.
The first paper to marry the social aspects with the challenge of E&E, a new research
domain for which we coin the term ‘social explore and exploit’, is Kremer et. al. [9]. In that
work the authors introduce a naive setting and study optimal explore and exploit schemes
that account for agents’ incentives.2 The following example is useful to understand the model
of social explore and exploit due to Kremer et. al.
Example 1.1. Assume there are two routes, denoted T(rain) and R(oad) from point A to
point B. The latencies in both alternatives are known to change on a daily basis. On each
given day the travel time on R is a constant that is sampled from a uniform distribution on
the interval [0, 6] (with a mean of 3 hours) whereas T is uniformly distributed on the interval
[1, 3] (with a mean of 2 hours). A benevolent dictator would like to make sure most agents take
1The mentioned work employ a game-theoretic setup. When restricted to convention evolution in pure
coordination games, other aspects such as the design of adaptation rules come into play [14, 8].
2We use the notion of a ‘naive setting’ for settings where the optimal non-social explore and exploit
scheme is trivial - try all actions sequentially, each once, and settle on the optimal one thereafter.
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the faster option on any given day. To do so he would dictate to the first arriving agent each
day to use option R and to the second one to use T after which he would surely know which
is the better option on that day. Hence, as of the third agent he would dictate the a-posteriori
optimal action. On the other hand, without any central mechanism, no self-motivated agent
will try alternative R and so with a high probability all agents will use the inferior option
each day (with probability Prob(R < T ) = 1
3
to be precise). In the ’social E&E’ setting we
introduce a central planner (one can think of it as a recommendation engine), which observes
the outcome of the agents and makes a non-enforceable recommendation to subsequent agents
on which action to take. Kremer et. al. show that the introduction of such a central planner
can lead to choosing the optimal action even when agents are self motivated.
To be more specific, Kremer et. al. identify an incentive compatible scheme with which
a central planner can asymptotically steer the users towards taking the optimal action. This
exciting news has been extended in [10] to several more elaborate bandit settings and to
additional optimization criteria such as regret minimization. An implicit assumption in
both papers is that agents cannot see each other’s behavior. This assumption turns out to
be critical. In fact, even with very little observability, for example when each agent just sees
his predecessor, the schemes proposed in both works cease to be incentive compatible and
lead to market failure. In this work we investigate the conditions on the social network which
allow for asymptotically optimal outcomes. Thus, we extend [9] by adding the additional
layer of a social network and show conditions under which the essence of their results, albeit
with a different mechanism, can still be maintained even though agents may observe each
other.
Needless to say, the ability to observe peers’ actions is realistic and quite common in
many applications, ranging from route recommendation to hotel recommendation and trans-
portation recommendation, etc. In any of these recommendation systems some exploration
may be needed, and no one wishes to be the one to explore so others can benefit, while some
observability of some others’ recommended actions does exist.
Technically, we extend the ‘social explore and exploit’ setting and incorporate the vis-
ibility of actions of peers in a social network, creating a more complete initial theory of
economic recommendation systems. We incorporate into the model of [9] a notion of visi-
bility, captured by a visibility graph. In the visibility graph agents are nodes, and an edge
(a, b) implies that agents a and b can observe each other’s action. Our main result is that
for a setting with N agents, when the number of nodes with degree greater than Nα is
bounded by Nβ , where 2α+β < 1, there exists an incentive-compatible algorithm leading to
asymptotically optimal outcome. In other words, there exists a recommendation mechanism
which agents will gladly follow and which ensures that a vanishing proportion of the agents
take a sub-optimal action. We also show that the result is tight, in the sense that there is
a visibility graph, where 2α + β = 1 (In particular the complete graph) and approximately
optimal outcome can not be obtained by any incentive-compatible algorithm.
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2 Model
We consider a setting where agents arrive sequentially and must choose an action from a
finite set A. The reward from taking action a ∈ A is given by a commonly known non-
atomic random variable Va taking values in some interval I = [L,R] and is the same across
all agents. Agents would like to maximize their value. At stage 0 neither the agents nor the
social planner know the value of the random variables {Va}a∈A. When agent n arrives the
social planner sees the choices made by agents 1, . . . , n−1 and the corresponding rewards and
chooses to communicate some message, m ∈M (a recommendation), to the agent. Based on
this message, as well as other information available to the agent, she chooses some action.
This extra information available to each agent is the actions chosen by some of his
predecessors, those that he can observe. Let N denote the set of N agents and for each
n ∈ N let B(n) ⊂ N \ {n} denote the set of friends of n. The agent arriving at stage t gets
to see the action (but not the reward) chosen by the subset of his friends that preceded him.
Coupled with the message received from the social planner he must choose his action.
Formally, The strategy of the social planner at time n is a function M˜n : (A×I)n−1 → M .3
Note that once some agent chooses the action a the realization of Va is known thereafter to
the social planner. Let agent n be the t-th agent arriving and let agents {1, 2, . . . , t− 1} be
his predecessors, then the strategy of agent n depends on the message communicated to him
by the planner and the actions taken by the set of agents Bt(n) = B(n) ∩ {1, 2, . . . , t − 1}.
That is, n’s strategy is represented by some function σn : A
Bt(n) ×M → A.4
The goal of each agent is to maximize her expected reward while the goal of the planner is
to maximize the expected average reward, or the expected proportion of agents who choose
an ex-post optimal action. Note that the social planner would like to induce agents to
experiment with previously untried actions. Ideally, the social planner would like each of the
first |A| agents to experiment with a different action. Once that happens she can ensure all
subsequent agents take the optimal action and asymptotically maximize the average reward.
On the other hand, agents are short-sighted and do not want to experiment with ex-ante
inferior actions. This tension is at the core of the analysis we provide.
Hereinafter we assume the set of alternatives is binary, |A| = {a, b}. Let µa, µb be the
expectations of Va, Vb correspondingly and assume, without loss of generality, that µa >
µb. In what follows, similar to Kremer et al [9], we provide a direct mechanism (one for
which M = A) which is incentive compatible (IC) and asymptotically optimal. That is,
agents comply with the mechanism’s recommendation in equilibrium and only a vanishing
proportion of players take the inferior action, for large enough N .
3Restricting the planner to pure strategies is done for the sake of simplicity only. It is easy to see that
each of the arguments in the following sections holds true when the planner is also allowed to use mixed
strategies, and that the resulting optimal strategy of the planner is pure.
4Our model assumes that agents know their position in the sequel. However the results reported here
extend to the case where agents arrive randomly and do not know their position in the sequel.
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2.1 The No Visibility Case
We begin with the exact setting of Kremer et al [9] and assume no visibility across agents
(‘blind’ agents). Formally this is the setting where B(n) = ∅ ∀n. The mechanism we
formulate is different than that introduced in [9]. Whereas we do not know how to adapt
the Kremer et al mechanism to the case with visibility ours can be adapted, as we do in
subsequent sections.
The underlying idea in the following construction is for the mechanism to recommend
action a to the first agent, who happily complies. Thereafter the mechanism knows the value
of Va. The mechanism commits up front to a finite set of agents to recommend action b only
when Va falls into some pre-defined set. For this to be incentive compatible the expected
value of Va, conditional on that set (which is the expectation of Va from the perspective of
the agent that is recommended b) must not be greater than µb. If the mechanism can ensure
that the aforementioned sets cover all the possible realizations of Va then surely one agent
at least will try action b. Note that these sets need not be disjoint and so it might be the
case the more than one agent is recommended b.
These sets will be induced by some partition of the interval I which is defined in the next
Lemma:
Lemma 2.1. There exists a finite partition {Dk}Kk=0 of [L,R] such that D0 = (L, µb),
E(Va|D0∪Dk) = µb ∀1 ≤ k ≤ K−1 and E(Va|D0∪DK) ≤ µb. Furthermore,
µa−µb
p(Va∈D0)[µb−E(Va|D0)]
+
1 ≤ K ≤
µa−
µb
2
p(Va∈D0)[µb−E(Va|D0)]
+ 2
Proof Consider the function f1(x) = E(Va|D0∪ [µb, µb+x]) defined for any nonnegative
x. Note that f1(0) < µb and f(R − µb) = µa > µb. As f1 is continuous there exists, by the
intermediate value theorem, a value x1 for which f1(x1) = µb. Set D1 = [µb, x1) (in fact, x1
is unique as f1 is monotonic.
If E(Va|D0∪ [µb, R]\D1) < µb then set K = 2 and D2 = [µb, R]\D1. Otherwise, consider
the function f2(x) = E(Va|D0 \D1 ∪ [x1, x1 + x]) applying the intermediate value theorem
as before, there must be some x2 such that f2(x2) = µb. Set D2 = [x1, x2).
Repeat this iteratively: Assume Dj = [xj−1, xj) have been defined for j = 1, . . . , k − 1.
If E(Va|D0 ∪ [xk−1, R]) < µb then set K = k, DK = [xk−1, R], and halt. Otherwise, let
fk(x) = E(Va|D0 \ ∪
k−1
j=1Dj ∪ [xk−1, xk−1 + x]). By applying the intermediate value theorem
as before, there must be some xk such that fk(xk) = µb. Set Dk = [xk−1, xk).
We now turn to argue that the above procedure eventually halts. To see this note that
µb = E(Va|D0 ∪Dk) =
P (Va ∈ D0)E(Va|D0) + P (Va ∈ Dk)E(Va|Dk)
P (Va ∈ D0) + P (Va ∈ Dk)
⇒
P (Va ∈ D0)E(Va|D0) + P (Va ∈ Dk)E(Va|Dk) = µb[P (Va ∈ D0) + P (Va ∈ Dk)]⇒
P (Va ∈ Dk)[E(Va|Dk)− µb] = P (Va ∈ D0)[µb − E(Va|D0)]⇒
P (Va ∈ Dk)E(Va|Dk) ≥ P (Va ∈ D0)[µb −E(Va|D0)].
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Note that the right hand side of the last inequality is some positive number, δ, independent
of k and also that E(Va|Dk) ≤ R. Hence P (Va ∈ Dk) ≥
δ
R
.
Summing over k: 1 ≥
∑K
k=0 P (Va ∈ Dk) ≥
∑K
k=0
δ
R
which implies that K ≤ R
δ
Let us now compute the upper bound on the value of K.
Note that since E(Va|D0 ∪DK−1) ≥ E(Va|D0 ∪DK)
∧
E(Va|DK) ≥ E(Va|DK−1) we can
conclude that p(Va ∈ DK) ≤ p(Va ∈ DK−1). As p(Va ∈ DK) + p(Va ∈ DK−1) ≤ 1 we get
p(Va ∈ DK) ≤
1
2
. Therefore, from the above we can conclude that:
ΣK−1k=1 P (Va ∈ D0 ∪Dk)E(Va|D0 ∪Dk) = µb[(K − 1)P (Va ∈ D0) + P (Va ∈ D1 ∪ ... ∪Dk−1)] =
µb[(K − 2)P (Va ∈ D0) + 1− P (Va ∈ DK) ≥ µb[(K − 2)P (Va ∈ D0) +
1
2
]. (1)
On the other hand we may substitute E(Va|D0∪Dk) with
p(Va∈D0)E(Va|D0)+p(Va∈Dk)E(Va|Dk)
p(Va∈D0∪Dk)
,
and so:
ΣK−1k=1 P (Va ∈ D0 ∪Dk)E(Va|D0 ∪Dk) =
ΣK−1k=1 p(Va ∈ D0)E(Va|D0) + p(Va ∈ Dk)E(Va|Dk) =
(K − 1)p(Va ∈ D0)E(Va|D0) + Σ
K−1
k=1 p(Va ∈ Dk)E(Va|Dk) =
(K − 2)P (Va ∈ D0)E(Va|D0) + µa − p(Va ∈ DK)E(Va|DK) ≤
(K − 2)P (Va ∈ D0)E(Va|D0) + µa (2)
From equations 2.1 and 2.1 we get:
(K − 2)P (Va ∈ D0)E(Va|D0) + µa ≥ [(K − 2)P (Va ∈ D0) +
1
2
]µb ⇒
K ≤
µa −
µb
2
p(Va ∈ D0)[µb −E(Va|D0)]
+ 2.
Finally, we also compute a lower bound on the value of K:5
ΣKk=1P (Va ∈ D0 ∪Dk)E(Va|D0 ∪Dk) ≤ µb[(K)P (Va ∈ D0) + P (Va ∈ D1 ∪ ... ∪DK)] =
µb[(K − 1)P (Va ∈ D0) + 1] (3)
On the other hand:
ΣKk=1P (Va ∈ D0 ∪Dk)E(Va|D0 ∪Dk) = Σ
K
k=1p(Va ∈ D0)E(Va|D0) + p(Va ∈ Dk)E(Va|Dk) =
(4)
5Note that we make use for this lower bound when we study high visibility graphs in section 2.3.
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= Kp(Va ∈ D0)E(Va|D0) + Σ
K
k=1p(Va ∈ Dk)E(Va|Dk) = (K − 1)P (Va ∈ D0)E(Va|D0) + µa
Combining equations 2.1 and 4 we get:
(K − 1)P (Va ∈ D0)E(Va|D0) + µa ≤ [(K − 1)P (Va ∈ D0) + 1]µb ⇒
K ≥
µa − µb
p(Va ∈ D0)[µb −E(Va|D0)]
+ 1.
Q.E.D
A direct revelation mechanism is a mechanism for which the message space equals the
action space, M = {a, b}. Given the partition {Dk}
K+1
k=0 we define the following direct
revelation mechanism for our social planner:
No Visibility Mechanism:
• If P (Va < µb) = 0 then set M˜
n = a ∀n.
• If P (Va < µb) > 0 then:
1. set M˜1 = a
2. For n = 2 . . . , K + 1 let M˜n = b whenever Va ∈ (D0 ∪ Dn−1) and M˜n = a
otherwise.
3. Let c ∈ A be the best action among those chosen by agents 1, . . . , K + 1. For
any agent n > K + 1 set M˜n = c.
We now turn to argue that the No Visibility Mechanism is incentive compatible, that is
each agent will use the action that is recommended to him by the planner. Hence one of the
agents 2, . . . , K + 1 will surely try action b. This, in turn, implies that all agents n > K + 1
will be recommended the optimal action.
Theorem 2.2. The No Visibility Mechanism is incentive compatible
Proof: Since µa > µb the first agent will clearly comply with the social planner’s recom-
mendation to take action a.
For each agent 2 ≤ j ≤ k + 1:
• Note that the event M˜ j = b is the same as the event Va ∈ (D0 ∪ Dj−1). Thus, the
expected reward from taking action a is E(Va|(D0 ∪Dj−1) = µb, which is exactly the
expected reward from taking action b. Agent j will therefore be indifferent between a
and b and might as well take action b as the planner recommended.
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• The event M˜n = a is equal the event Va /∈ (D0∪Dn−1). However as E(Va|(D0∪Dn−1) =
µb < µa we conclude that the expected reward from taking action a, given the message
M˜n = a is E(Va|Va /∈ (D∪Dn−1)) > µb, where the expected reward from taking action
b is µb. Therefore agent j will prefer action a, as recommended by the planner.
Recall that ∪Kk=0Dk = [L,R] which implies that at least one agent will be recommended,
and consequently choose, action b. Therefore, for any agent j > K + 1 the planner recom-
mends the optimal action and so agents will comply.
Q.E.D
Definition 2.3. Let Uj be the utility of agent j. An incentive compatible direct revelation al-
gorithm is asymptotically optimal if ∀ǫ > 0, ∃N¯ such that ∀N ≥ N¯ , Va, Vb ∈ I :
ΣN
k=1
Uk
N max(Va,Vb)
>
1− ǫ. In words, the average utility of the agents goes to max(Va, Vb).
Corollary 2.4. If P (Va < µb) > 0 then the No Visibility Mechanism is asymptotically
optimal
Proof: By Theorem 2.2 the No Visibility Mechanism is incentive compatible and so after
the first K + 1 agents the social planner knows the values of both Va and Vb. This ensures
that agents k+2....N will take the optimal action. As K is independent of the total number
of agents, N , the proportion of agents taking the optimal action increases to one as N grows.
Q.E.D
Note that this gives an alternative technique to [9], which can be later generalized to
address the case of network that allows for visibility.
2.2 The Medium Visibility Case
We next turn to study the case where all agents do have some visibility, albeit limited
visibility. In particular we assume that |B(n)| ≤ Nα ∀n and for some α < 0.5. Unfortunately
we cannot use the No Visibility Mechanism as it may become non incentive compatible
whenever B(n) 6= ∅ (at least for the first K agents). We turn to explain the underlying
reasons we lose the IC(incentive compatible) property:
1. What happens when k > j, both are in K and j ∈ B(k)? Consider an instance where
Va ∈ Dk. In that case assuming IC, j will take action a and k will be recommended
action b. From these two, agent k concludes that Va ∈ (D0 ∪Dk) \ (D0 ∪Dj) = Dk, in
which case he will take action a, contradicting IC.
2. What happens when k > v > j > i, where i, j, k are in K but v is not in K, and both
i, j are in B(v) while v is in B(k)? Consider an instance where Va ∈ Dk. In that case
assuming IC, i and j will take action a, v will see that both i and j took action a
and will take action a as recommended, and k will be recommended action b. But k
can see that v took action a. However if Va ∈ D0 then assuming IC both j and k will
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take action b and since v can see both of them he can conclude Va ∈ D0 and ”herd” b.
Therefore k can conclude Va ∈ D0 ∪Dk \D0 = Dk in which case he will take action a,
contradicting IC.
However, a variant of the No Visibility Mechanism, which we term the Medium Visibility
Mechanism, works. The way we adapt to the medium visibility case is by choosing the set
of K agents in a way that they do not see each other, directly or indirectly, which is why the
original mechanism fails. This will entail an increase in the number of initial agents which
are not necessarily recommended the optimal action from K + 1 to a larger number, but
nevertheless the asymptotic efficiency will still prevail.
To introduce this variant we use the following notation: For a subset of agents N˜ ⊂ N ,
B(N˜) = ∪n∈N˜B(n). In words, B(N˜) is the set of neighbors of N˜ .
The main idea behind the following algorithm is to find K agents that cannot see each
other, moreover that there is no possibility that any other agent (outside of those K agents)
will be able to see two or more agents from this group, so no other agent can reflect the
group choices to other agents from the group. Note that this algorithm is dynamic and we
do not need to know the order of arrival in advance.
Medium Visibility Mechanism:
• Let M = {a, b}
• If P (Va < µb) = 0 then M˜n = a ∀n
• If P (Va < µb) > 0 then set M˜1 = a, ρ˜ = ∅, k = 0, and N˜ = ∅
• For n = 2, . . . , N :
– While k < K do:
∗ If n ∈ {B(ρ˜) ∪B(B(ρ˜))} then M˜n = a and N˜ = N˜ ∪ {n}.
∗ If n 6∈ {B(ρ˜) ∪B(B(ρ˜))} then ρ˜ = ρ˜ ∪ {n}, k = k + 1 and
· M˜n = b whenever Va ∈ (D0 ∪Dk)
· M˜n = a otherwise.
– If k = K then M˜n = argmaxa,b(Va, Vb).
Note that the above mechanism essentially applies the No Visibility Mechanism to the
subset ρ˜ of agents. In the process it ‘ignores’ another set of agents, those that have high
visibility, and are denoted N˜ . The next lemma argues that the agents in N˜ have limited
visibility into ρ˜:
Lemma 2.5. Any agent n ∈ N˜ sees at most one agent in ρ˜.
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Proof: Let us assume this is not true and that in fact there exist i, j ∈ ρ˜ such that i < j
and i, j ∈ B(n). Let i, j be the first two such agents to satisfy these requirements. Note that
n ∈ B(i) and j ∈ B(n) which implies that j ∈ B(B(i)). This, in turn, is a contradiction to
the fact that j ∈ ρ˜.
QED
Theorem 2.6. The Medium Visibility Mechanism is incentive compatible.
Proof: Similar to the No Visibility Mechanism, the first agent will get the message a and
will optimally comply. We now consider 3 cases: an agent in N˜ , an agent in ρ˜ and agents j
arriving when k = K.
1. Consider an agent n ∈ N˜ who is necessarily recommended action a. Assume all other
agents follow the recommendation of the mechanism. By Lemma 2.5, |B(n) ∩ ρ˜| ≤ 1.
Assume |B(n) ∩ ρ˜| = 0 then agent n has no other information above and beyond his
prior and hence chooses action a as he is recommended. If |B(n) ∩ ρ˜| = 1 then the
agent in ρ˜ that n observes, say agent j, may have either taken action a or b. In the
former case n infers that Va 6∈ (D0 ∪Dj) which implies that Va is better than b and so
action a is chosen. In the latter case n infers that Va ∈ (D0 ∪Dj), from which he can
only conclude that the expected reward in both actions is equal and hence will also
take action a.
2. Consider an agent j ∈ ρ˜ and assume all other agents follow the recommendation of the
mechanism. According to theMedium Visibility Mechanism, j /∈ B(ρ˜\{j}). Therefore,
all the predecessors observed by agent j have received no information and so provide
j with no information themselves. Therefore, his expected reward from both actions,
given the recommendation of the Medium Visibility Mechanism is the same as that of
agent j+1 in the case B(n) = ∅ and a recommendation of the No Visibility Mechanism.
Incentive compatibility of j follows now from Theorem 2.2 .
3. Consider an agent j arriving when k = K and assume all other agents follow the
recommendation of the mechanism. Recall that ∪Kk=0Dk = [L,R] which implies that
at least one agent from ρ˜ chose action b. Therefore, the planner recommends agent j
the optimal action and so he will comply.
Q.E.D
Theorem 2.7. If |B(n)| ≤ Nα ∀n then the value of the parameter k of the Medium Visibility
Mechanism terminates in K whenever N > 2(K−1)N2α. Furthermore, in that case |ρ˜∪N˜ | ≤
2(K − 1)N2α.
Proof: Assume the algorithm terminates with a value j < K. By the construction
|B(ρ˜)| ≤ Nα|ρ˜| and so |B(B(ρ˜))| ≤ N2α|ρ˜| at the termination. As |ρ˜| = j there are at most
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j(Nα+N2α) agents in B(ρ˜)∪B(B(ρ˜)). And so if there are more than j(Nα+N2α) additional
agents one must satisfy the conditions required to join ρ˜. However, this must hold true for
any j = 1, . . . , K − 1 whenever there are initially j +
∑K−1
j=1 j(N
α + N2α) ≤ 2(K − 1)N2α
agents. Hence a contradiction.
Q.E.D
Corollary 2.8. if |B(n)| ≤ Nα ∀n and α < 0.5 then the Medium Visibility Mechanism is
asymptotically optimal
Proof: By Theorems 2.6 and 2.7 the Medium Visibility Mechanism is incentive compat-
ible for large enough N and so after k = K the social planner knows the values of Va and Vb.
By Theorem 2.7 k = K after at most 2(K − 1)N2α agents. and so at most 2(K − 1)N2α will
take the inferior action. As K is independent of the total number of agents, N , and 2α < 1
the proportion of agents taking the optimal action increases to one as N grows.
Q.E.D
2.3 The High Visibility Case
We next extend our results and mechanisms to the case where a limited number of agents
may exhibit a high number of neighbors. By this we mean that there exist agents for
which |B(n)| > Nα, however there are less than Nβ such agents, where α and β are non-
negative parameters satisfying 2α+β < 1. Note the the Medium Visibility case satisfies this
restrictions as α < 0.5 and β = 0 in the environment.
The Medium Visibility Mechanism offers a solution when |B(n)| ≤ Nα ∀n. However it
may fail whenever there is even a single agent j where |B(j)| > Nα. The failure is due to the
fact that the algorithm may terminate while k = 1, in which case the conditions of Theorem
2.7 are not satisfied. As an example of such an outcome consider a star shaped graph and
an arrival order where the central agent arrives last.6
However, a variant of the No Visibility Mechanism and the Medium Visibility Mechanism
works. The way we adapt the mechanism is by replicating the set of K sets many times.
Recall that each of the original K sets was a union of two sets - D0 from the left hand side
of the mean µb and some Dk from the right hand side of µb. This construction implies that
whenever an agent is recommended b but happens to see that some agent before him took
action a then he can conclude that Va > µb and refuse to accept the recommendation. To
remedy this we construct the replicas in such a way that there is no overlap of the left hand
side of one set from one replica with the left hand side of another set from another replica.
Thus, if a low visibility agent that was recommended b by the mechanism sees some high
visibility agent that has taken action a he will not be ‘polluted’ by their action and will
comply with the recommendation to take action b. To achieve this the mechanism uses a
given replica of K sets as long as no high visibility agent arrives. When a high visibility
agent arrives the mechanism moves to the next replica of K sets.
6Recall the mechanism is not forward looking and hence does not know that the central agent comes last.
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Let us now turn to the construction. Let {D00, . . . , D
Nβ
0 } be a partition of D0 = [L, µb)
such that E(Va|Va ∈ D
j
0) = E(Va|Va ∈ D0) and p(Va ∈ D
j
0) =
1
Nβ+1
P (Va ∈ D0) ∀j =
0, . . . , Nβ.7
Let {D1, D2, . . . , DK ′} be a partition of the segment [µb, R] such that E(Va|Va ∈ D
j
0 ∪
Di) = µb ∀j = 0, . . . , Nβ, i = 1, . . . , K ′.
Lemma 2.9. K ′ ≤
µa−
µb
2
µa−µb
(Nβ+1)(k−1)+2 where K is the number of segments from Lemma
2.1.
Proof: The upper bound computed in Lemma 2.1 for K now applies to K ′. Hence, for
any set Dj0:
K ′ ≤
µa −
µb
2
p(Va ∈ D
j
0)[µb − E(Va|Va ∈ D
j
0)]
+ 2 =
µa −
µb
2
1
Nβ+1
p(Va ∈ D0)[µb − E(Va|Va ∈ D0)]
+ 2 =
=
µa −
µb
2
µa − µb
(Nβ + 1)
µa − µb
p(Va ∈ D0)[µb −E(Va|Va ∈ D0)]
+ 2 ≤
µa −
µb
2
µa − µb
(Nβ + 1)(K − 1) + 2,
where the last inequality follows from the lower bound on K computed in Lemma 2.1.
Q.E.D
Fix some parameter α and let T = {n : |B(n)| ≤ Nα}. Let S be the remaining set of
agents and assume β satisfies |S| ≤ Nβ .
The following mechanism is a variant of the Medium Visibility Mechanism. As usual, the
first agent takes action a and Va is revealed. At some point an agent is chosen as a candidate
for a dynamic message (all others get the action a). This agent should not be a (first or
second order) neighbor of any previous such agent. In contrast with the Medium Visibility
Mechanism, the notion of neighbor we use is a neighbor in the sub-graph induced by the
set T . The message to this agent depends on whether or not Va ∈ Dz0 ∪ Di, where i is the
counter of the candidates and z is the counter for the number of agents from S that have
appeared so far. The extra trick we use here is that whenever an agent with many neighbors
arrives we use a new sub-segment of D0 and as a result candidate agents cannot conclude
anything from observing agents is S.
Let us denote by BT (j) = B(j) ∩ T , the neighbors of j in T , and naturally extend this
to sets as follows, BT (N¯) = ∪n∈N¯BT (n).
High Visibility Mechanism:Let M = {a, b} × {TRUE, FALSE, SPECIAL}. If
P (Va < µb) = 0 then M˜
n = (a, TRUE) ∀n. Otherwise:
1. set M˜1 = (a, TRUE)
7This is feasible as Va is non-atomic.
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2. set experiment = TRUE, z = 0, ρ˜ = ∅, k = 0, knowledge = FALSE and c = a
3. For agents n = 2, . . . , N :
• if (experiment = TRUE)
While k < K ′ do:
– If n ∈ S then
∗ let z = z + 1
∗ if knowledge = TRUE:
· set experiment = FALSE.
· set c = argmaxa,b(Va, Vb).
· M˜n = (c, FALSE)
∗ if knowledge = FALSE:
· M˜n = (a, TRUE).
– If n ∈ T then
∗ If n /∈ BT (ρ˜) ∪BT (BT (ρ˜)) then ρ˜ = ρ˜ ∪ {n} and k = k + 1.
· If Va ∈ Dz0 ∪ Dk then M˜n = (b, TRUE) and set knowledge =
TRUE.
· Otherwise M˜n = (a, TRUE)
∗ If n ∈ BT (ρ˜) ∪BT (BT (ρ˜)) then M˜n = (a, TRUE).
If k = K ′ then:
– if knowledge = TRUE:
∗ set experiment = FALSE.
∗ set c = argmaxa,b(Va, Vb)
∗ M˜n = (c, FALSE)
– if knowledge = FALSE: (special case where Va ∈ Dz0 ∪ ... ∪D
Nβ
0 )
∗ M˜n = (b, SPECIAL)
∗ knowledge = TRUE
• if (experiment = FALSE) then M˜n = (c, FALSE)
Theorem 2.10. The High Visibility Mechanism is incentive compatible.8
Proof: Similar to the No Visibility Mechanism and the Medium Visibility Mechanism,
the first agent will get the message (a, FALSE) and will optimally comply. We now consider
7 cases:
8As the message space is formally not equal the action space what we clearly mean by IC is that agents
will comply with the first component of the emessage, which is an action.
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1. Case 1: (experiment = TRUE, k < K ′, n ∈ S and knowledge = FALSE ): In
this case the mechanism recommended (a, TRUE). Assume all other agents follow the
recommendation of the mechanism. Since Vb is not known to the planner it is obvious
that all the actions that agent n can see are a. And since µa > µb agent n will take
action a as recommended.
2. Case 2: (experiment = TRUE, k < K ′, n ∈ S and knowledge = TRUE)(the
first arriving agent from S following knowledge = TRUE):Assume all other agents
follow the recommendation of the mechanism. However in the case the High Visibility
Mechanism will set experiment = FALSE and compute the optimal action before
sending the message to n. The message sent to agent n will contain FALSE which
will inform him that the experiment phase is over. Whenever the flag in the message
is FALSE (experiment phase over) the planner recommends agent n the optimal action
and so he will comply.
3. Case 3: (experiment = TRUE, k < K ′, n ∈ T and n ∈ ρ˜). Assume all other
agents follow the recommendation of the mechanism. Let us consider the following
options:
• Agent n sees at least one agent from S that took action b: Note that Assuming all
other agents follow the recommendation of the mechanism according to the High
Visibility Mechanism an agent from S will take action b only if Vb = max(Va, Vb)
and the experiment flag will set to FALSE. In that case, however experiment =
FALSE (see case 7 below)
• Agent n does not see any agent from S that took action b:
– M˜n = (a, TRUE) : Given agent n can not see any agent from S that took
action b, following the proof of theorem 2.6 where j ∈ ρ˜ will prove incentive
compatibility.
– M˜n = (b, TRUE) : Whenever an agent from S arrives we use a new sub-
segment of D0 (change from D
z
0 to D
z+1
0 ) and as a result it is obvious that
if Va ∈ Dz0 ∪ Di then he can not see any agent from S that took action b
and therefore neither the agents from S nor the TRUE flag add him any
additional information. Therefore following the proof of theorem 2.6 where
j ∈ ρ˜ will prove incentive compatibility.
4. Case 4: (experiment = TRUE, k < K ′, n ∈ T and n /∈ ρ˜): Assume all other
agents follow the recommendation of the mechanism. Let us consider the following
options:
• Agent n sees at least one agent from S that took action b: Note that assuming all
other agents follow the recommendation of the mechanism according to the High
Visibility Mechanism an agent from S will take action b only if Vb = max(Va, Vb)
and the experiment flag will set to FALSE. In that case, however experiment =
FALSE (see case 7 below)
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• Agent n does not see any agent from S that took action b: In that case following
the proof of theorem 2.6 where n ∈ N˜ will prove incentive compatibility.
5. Case 5: (experiment = TRUE, k = K ′, and knowledge = FALSE): In this
case the mechanism recommended (b, SPECIAL). Assume all other agents follow the
recommendation of the mechanism. Since ∪K
′
i=1Di = [µb, R] We get that this special
case is reached if and only if Va ∈ ∪N
β
z=zD
z
0. But E(Va|Va ∈ ∪
Nβ
z=zD
z
0) ≤ µb. This implies
that b is at least as good as Va. So agent that receives ”special” in his recommendation
will comply.
6. Case 6: (experiment = TRUE, k = K ′, and knowledge = TRUE):Assume all
other agents follow the recommendation of the mechanism. If k = K ′ and knowledge =
TRUE the mechanism finish the experiment phase by setting experiment = FALSE
and the message sent to agent n and to all the following agents will contain FALSE.
Whenever the flag in the message is FALSE (experiment phase over) the planner rec-
ommends agent n the optimal action and so he will comply.
7. Case 7: (experiment = FALSE): The message sent to the agent will contain
FALSE. Assume all other agents follow the recommendation of the mechanism.
Whenever the flag is FALSE (experiment phase over) the planner recommends agent
n the optimal action and so he will comply.
Q.E.D
Theorem 2.11. Fix some parameter α and let T = {n : |B(n)| ≤ Nα}. Let S be the remain-
ing set of agents and assume β satisfies |S| ≤ Nβ. Then the High Visibility Mechanism will
set experiment = FALSE after at most 3K(
µa−
µb
2
µa−µb
Nβ+2α) agents, where K is the number
from Lemma 2.1.
Proof:
We can deduce from the proof of Theorem 2.7 that at most 2(K ′ − 1)N2α agents from T
arrive before the parameter k of the High Visibility Mechanism takes the value K ′. Since
|S| ≤ Nβ there are at most Nβ agents from S that arrive before k = K ′. Once k = K ′
there could possibly be one extra agent until the parameter experiment takes on the value
FALSE. Therefore, the High Visibility Mechanism will set experiment = FALSE after less
than 2(K ′ − 1)N2α +Nβ + 1 agents. However, according to Lemma 2.9, K ′ ≤
µa−
µb
2
µa−µb
(Nβ +
1)(K − 1) + 2. Therefore the maximal number of agents that arrive before experiment =
FALSE is 2(K ′ − 1)N2α + Nβ + 1 ≤ 2(
µa−
µb
2
µa−µb
(Nβ + 1)(K − 1) + 2 − 1)N2α + Nβ + 1 ≤
3K(
µa−
µb
2
µa−µb
Nβ+2α).
Q.E.D
Corollary 2.12. Fix some parameter α and let T = {n : |B(n)| ≤ Nα}. Let S be the
remaining set of agents and assume β satisfies |S| ≤ Nβ. If β + 2α < 1 then the High
Visibility Mechanism is asymptotically optimal
15
Proof:
As proved in theorem 2.10 and 2.11 the High Visibility Mechanism is incentive compatible
and assure experiment = FALSE after at most 3K(
µa−
µb
2
µa−µb
Nβ+2α)agents. And so at most
3K(
µa−
µb
2
µa−µb
Nβ+2α) will take the inferior action. As K,µa, µb are independent of the total
number of agents, N , and since β + 2α < 1 the proportion of agents taking the optimal
action increases to one as N grows. Q.E.D
2.4 The Very High Visibility Case
As we have seen the High Visibility Mechanism works well with social networks where T =
{n : |B(n)| ≤ Nα} and S, the remaining set of agents, satisfies |S| ≤ Nβ, as long as
2α + β < 1. What happens if the social network fails to satisfy this visibility requirements.
In our next Theorem we argue, via an example, that IC and efficiency cannot be guaranteed
for such very high visibility networks.
In particular we demonstrate the impossibility for the case α = 0 and β = 1, which
implies that all agents can see each other:
Theorem 2.13. Let B(n) = N for all n and assume E(Va|Va < x) > µb, where x = inf{y :
Prob(Vb < y) = 1}. Then no incentive compatible asymptotically efficient mechanism exists.9
Proof: Assume an IC and asymptotically efficient mechanism exists. Let Wn ⊂ I be the
set for which agent n is the first agent that is recommended to experiment with b. As the
mechanism is asymptotically efficient it must be the case that for any value if Va ≤ x some
agent will experiment with b, hence [L, x) ⊂ ∪nWn ⊂ I, which implies
E[Va|Va ∈ ∪nWn] ≥ E(Va|Va < x) > µb. (5)
IC, coupled with the fact that agent n can observe all past agents implies E[Va|Va ∈ Wn \
∪n−1j=1Wj] ≤ µb for all n. Hence E[Va|Va ∈ ∪n(Wn \ ∪
n−1
j=1Wj)] ≤ µb. Note that ∪n(Wn \
∪n−1j=1Wj) = ∪nWn and so E[Va|Va ∈ ∪nWn] ≤ µb, contradicting inequality 5.
Q.E.D
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